From Shergar to the Negev: What Happens When State Authority Fails?
Between a fog-covered field in Ireland in 1983 and an almost deserted street in the Negev in 2026, four decades and two continents seem to separate the two scenes. Yet the abduction of the legendary racehorse Shergar, owned by the Aga Khan, and the persistent crime crisis in Israel’s Arab society each raise, in their own way, the same question: what happens to state authority when its institutions fail to provide security in its periphery?
Shergar disappeared in February 1983 in County Kildare, Ireland. The horse had become a legend following a series of exceptional victories, but was never found. The investigation was marked by several failures, including the police’s inability to act promptly on a telephone lead. Over time, the case became a symbol not only of mystery, but also of the limitations of security institutions when confronted with an exceptional operation.
In Israel’s Negev, the problem is fundamentally different. It is not a single event, but a form of insecurity that has become structural. In 2026, residents of several Arab communities live with the fear of shootings, violent disputes and criminal violence. Closed businesses, deserted streets and concerns surrounding schools are among the ways crime can reshape the most basic routines of daily life.
The comparison ends, however, when the causes are examined. The Irish failure of 1983 involved a specific operation and identifiable institutional shortcomings. In the Negev, the difficulties are the result of problems that have accumulated over many years.
A 2026 report by Israel’s State Comptroller warned of persistent governance problems in the Negev, particularly in Bedouin localities, as well as shortages of police personnel. The report described improving governance in the south as a strategic challenge for Israel.
Two competing narratives
Israeli authorities, including National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and the police, have defended intensified operations against criminal networks. According to figures cited by police, shootings have fallen significantly in Bedouin communities in the Negev and hundreds of people have been arrested.
Within Arab society, however, some critics argue that security operations alone cannot address the problem and have raised concerns about methods they consider disproportionate or stigmatizing. For these voices, security, economic development, public services and equal access to infrastructure are closely interconnected.
This may be where the central issue lies. Is security a prerequisite for development, or is development itself a prerequisite for lasting security?
The debate cannot simply be reduced to a choice between enforcement and development. A state has a responsibility to protect its citizens, while a sustainable security policy also requires addressing the social, economic and institutional conditions that allow crime to become entrenched.
Forty-three years after Shergar disappeared, his story continues to fascinate precisely because it never reached a definitive conclusion. In the Negev, the absence of a lasting solution produces a different phenomenon: the normalization of crisis.
Perhaps this is where the metaphor of the “dead horse” acquires its meaning. Repeating the same methods indefinitely without measuring their results does not resolve a crisis. The question is therefore no longer simply how to strengthen existing operations, but how to build a strategy capable of restoring security and trust over the long term.
Kaid Abulatif
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